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Resumen: Para los escritores libaneses clericales, ligados a Occidente por el francés y 
el latín, la masacre de la I Guerra Mundial evidenció que las ideologías pro-católica 
y secularista habían resultado fallidas para mantener la paz y la prosperidad en 
Europa. Los clericales se sentían atados al destino de los estados europeos, cuyo 
secularismo odiaban al vincularse estéticamente a las lenguas latinas. Éstos también 
sintieron la necesidad de un protector contra algunos musulmanes después de que la 
hostilidad turca en Monte Líbano destruyera la antigua ideología con tendencia al 
desarrollo del multisectarismo otomano.   
 
Abstract: For those clerical Lebanese writers bound to the West by  
French and Latin, the slaughter of World War I showed that both pro-Catholic  
and secularist ideologies had failed to maintain peace and prosperity in  
Europe.  The clericists felt they were tied to the fate of the European states the  
secularism of which they hated by binding themselves aesthetically to the Latin 
languages. They also felt the need of a protector against some Muslims after 
Turkish hostility in Mount Lebanon destroyed the old ideology of Ottoman multi-
sectarian developmental tendency. 
 
Palabras Clave: Occidente. Secularismo estatal radical. Pan-catolicismo. Colapso de 
Europa y de sus ideologías. Armenios. Turcos. 
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 This study will analyze a sampling of Lebanese images and assessments 
of World War I taken from the clerical intellectual journal al-Mashriq, edited 
by Fr. Luis Shaykhū, and the more popular but likewise Jesuit-founded al-
Bashīr newspaper from 1919-1925. A nativist tradition has existed in Maronite 
discourses that has been the reverse of eager to imbibe Europe’s patterns of 
Catholicism, or French or other Western languages, or the secularized 
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ideologies or histories of France and other Western societies. But as 
publications founded by European Catholics, and inclusive in their 
Catholicism rather than just Maronite, al-Mashriq and al-Bashīr carried the 
maximum range of reactions to the European as well as Middle Eastern 
theatres of the Great War. 
 
THE PERCEPTIONS OF THE WARRING WESTERNERS 
 
1. Images of France (and French-speaking Belgium) in WW1 
 
1.1. Ambivalence to France and the West 
  
The pre-World War I and post-WW1 setting of al-Mashriq had inculcated 
neither automatic support for Western powers such as France, nor automatic 
alienation from Muslim groups. Many clerical Catholic educators and writers 
in the 1920s feared that rising radical forces inspired by French anti-
Christianity might soon take overall control of all levels of education in 
Lebanon, threatening both the clericists’ survival as an elite and the 
transmission of a sectionally modernized Catholicism to new generations. 
Opposed local writers argued that secularist education had to be expanded to 
integrate the heterogeneous sects of post-1920 Greater Lebanon lest it one day 
fall apart. The dislike both clericists and modernizing Christians were 
developing for French and Western cultures qua exclusionary absolutes in 
education and government was Arabist common ground with Muslims that 
could foster some features for a linguistic nationalism.  
The World War in some ways had underscored the need of the region’s 
Christians for a Protector. But, in a sense, Shaykhū and his fellow 
conservatives were simultaneously arguing against the modern world as that 
was being patterned into existence by the history of the West, in particular 
thinkers who drew upon the Enlightenment and the French Revolution. One of 
the gravest consequences of WW1 for clericist writers was that by bringing 
down the Tsarist state it had ushered atheistical Communists to political 
power. But Catholic conservatives in Lebanon in the early 1920s characterized 
socialisms and the infant Soviet Union as one late emanation of the much 
wider secular sector of European Enlightenment thought that had been 
launched in France.1 Clearly, Shaykhū – ideologue revered of a Maronite 
Church that was buying more and more agricultural land and would under 
Patriarch Anūn ɜArīah venture into modern services and manufactures – was 
reluctant to let even social democratic parties or trade unions pursue any 
special interest of poor groups within politics. 
Most clericists and Lebanese modernists read French, and both groups 
                                                 
1
  L. SHAYKHŪ, “Al-Bulshufiyyūn: aṣlu-hum wa-mabādiɛu-hum wa-aɜmālu-hum”, al-Mashriq 
(January 1920), pp. 47-54. 
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were anxious to prove to readers of Arabic that Europe was on their side. Such 
respect for France and the West among Christian Lebanese favored the 
secularists more than the clericists in the debate given the movement of many 
West European nationalist states and certainly the French state to post-
Christian patterns and ideas. 
However, the spread in Lebanon of French-medium institutions and of 
connections with the French state had, since the 18th century, improved the 
material welfare and the bargaining power of diverse categories of Maronites 
in the Muslim-dominated Ottoman Empire. Shaykhū and other clericists who 
felt little love for some central thought-patterns and institutions connected to 
the secular French state, had still received formal Christian education in 
French: that language bonded them aesthetically to that polity. This 
acculturation and the formal Catholicism of most Frenchmen had kept enough 
strength to rally those writers to a French state they disliked when the context 
became her survival in the face of Germany. 
 
1.2. France in the War 
  
The Lebanese clericists’ vision of the war was shaped by their bilingual 
bookishness as well as by religious emotions on which Allied propaganda 
played. Religious and other cultural sites influenced the opting for the French 
side by the clerical writers. Fascinated by the science of the new technology of 
long-range bombardment that France too developed in the War, Rafāɛīl 
Nakhlah the Jesuit noted that German long-range artillery firing on Paris on 23 
March 1918 and thereafter from 120 kilometers away killed in a church 79 
people who had come for prayer on Good Friday.2 Germany’s indiscriminate 
[or intentional? neo-pagan?] bombardments of sacred places of the Christians 
such as Riems cathedral fueled Shaykhū’s choice of sides: the French troops 
did not destroy public buildings, churches and palaces and factories as the 
Germans did, except when they were fortified to shelter hostile Germans – 
sleight of hand that barely concealed that total war had brutalized the French, 
too, to religious and other art or sites or culture as precious in themselves. And 
Shaykhū now swallowed too the self-validating propaganda of the French that 
they, if few others, stood for principles and universal [secular] enterprises far 
wider than the nationalisms firing the mayhem. A collapse of France would 
have ended “the freedom and liberty of the whole civilized world” – not a 
perspective in his Ottoman-era attacks upon freemasonry emanating from the 
anti-clerical laicist French polity. 
As was the case in other Muslim or Christian magazines in the Middle 
East, the demands of conveying the incessantly expanding technology of 
modern warfare widened the scope and capacity of the literary Arabic of 
                                                 
2
  Rafāɛīl NAKHLAH SJ, “Taraqq al-ɜulūm mundhu nushūb al-arb”, al-Mashriq (September 
1920), pp. 641-642. 
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Shaykhū and his al-Mashriq colleagues in the wake of World War I. On the 
whole, they conveyed the unprecedented technology well in their preferred 
literary language. 
Like many clerical Lebanese writers, Shaykhū could have a sharp eye for 
the technical and practical manifestations of science (eg. war-planes and tanks) 
despite being at odds with so many things in the overall spirit of the modern 
West. But old Christian energies to his mind underlay France’s new 
technologies of warfare. Shaykhū was trying to blend that French nationalism 
with Catholicism. The fighter pilot Georges-Marie Guynemer (1894-1917) in 
devastating the German airforce made people associate him with such “heroes” 
as Peter the Hermit and [recently canonized] Joan of Arc.3 Here, Shaykhū had 
got close to sectors of medieval Christian history that some secular French 
writers too could and did integrate into their nationalism after a fashion. But he 
was unmindful of how much cultivated Muslim Arab readers might be 
antagonized by such linking of his Catholic group’s ethos and a modern France 
that was now in Lebanon to Peter, a quasi-Frenchman whose incitatory 
preachings across Europe raised a huge if motley army for the crusade 
proclaimed by Pope Urban II. Hermit Peter preached a sermon on the Mount 
of Olives shortly before the Frankish forces stormed Jerusalem in 1096, 
wresting the al-Aqsa mosque from the Islamic world with massacres of any 
Muslims.  
 Shaykhū gave a sharp overview of the evolution of tanks during WW1 – 
“those fortified mobile machines equipped with machineguns that played an 
important role in the [World] War especially in its late period, casting fear into 
the souls of the Germans and directing death at their armies”. However, the 
recent post-WW1 local history of Lebanon and Syria perhaps led Shaykhū to 
overrate their importance earlier in the fighting in Europe. “Tanks also played 
a considerable role in the recent triumph of the French against [Fayal’s 
	ijāzī-Syrian] troops, opening up for them the road to Damascus. Their 
number in the French army is [now] several thousand”. Thus, Shaykhū’s 
approval of France’s scientifically innovative military might came in the 
context of his loyalty to her at that point as a protector and at least patron to 
whom he gave title to crush neighboring Arab polities that could destabilize 
the fragile new Lebanon. 
 Fr Shaykhū’s (as the Jesuit Rafāɛīl Nakhlah’s) accounts of the military 
technologies the various combatants evolved in WW1 stand up today beside 
recent Western military overviews. However, his residence in the Arab world 
obscured from him much of the ongoing crisis the War had bequeathed in the 
morale of the Westerners. Rather, his stance to the War was an out-of-date 
ideological endorsement of the polity that now protected Lebanon. In her 
                                                 
3
  L. SHAYKHŪ, “Aɜ
amu āmmah fī l-arb al-ɜāmmah: na
arun ijmālī fī l-arb al-ūrūbbiyyah al-
ākhirah”, al-Mashriq (February 1920), p. 137. 
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contest with Germany, France had functioned as the fulcrum of the world of 
Civilization in Asia and Africa as well as upon the battlefields of Europe. 
Despite all he knew of how many French people the War had killed and 
maimed, his ultimate tone was triumphalist in a way that rang hollow: France 
fought on steadfastly for more than four years through the terrors of the War 
until the laurels of total victory were placed upon her head.4  
 
1.3. Belgium: Catholicism and Resistant Patriotism 
   
When imaging World War 1, Shaykhū’s Francophone pan-Catholicism did 
not allow him to develop the critical nuances about the Elder Daughter of the 
Church which could mark his discussion when the context was not the French 
polity’s survival. His history of the War characterized the Belgium polity and 
its ruling groups as simplistically. For him, Belgium was the small Catholic 
victim of an implicitly almost non-Christian Germany. All the conflicting 
states of Europe had undertaken in their preceding pacts not to violate the 
borders of Belgium, but Germany violated international law when she invaded 
that small state. Faced with so overwhelmingly larger an occupying state, 
Belgium could have submitted with only verbal protests, the approach tiny 
Luxembourg understandably took. But Belgium’s gallant king preferred to risk 
his state “amid the sympathy of the whole civilized world”. Shaykhū ascribed 
to Kaiser Wilhelm II a letter that “all things have to be burnt and all – men, 
women and the elderly – killed and every tree and house destroyed because 
such means of terror can end the war before two months pass”. Belgium’s 
Catholicity, her official French language and culture, and the function of her 
resistance in delaying Germany’s attack on France as the latter mobilized, all 
pushed Shaykhū to idealize that small polity and its ruling class. 
 While his book usually characterized the War’s theatres in traditional 
military terms, Shaykhū’s tribute to Belgium did take some account of civilian 
suffering and resistance. He described how the Belgian civilians brought out 
an underground daily newspaper that the occupiers could not trace, and which 
gave details of their tricks and oppression to the whole world. However, 
Shaykhū placed an iconic hero who blended the French language and high 
Catholicism with Belgian nationalism at the head of the resistance. “That 
gallant primate, the honor of the religion, learning and the homeland, the 
cardinal [Desiree Joseph] Mercier defended the rights of his flock without 
regard to the governors of the Germans, who spared no effort to win him over, 
or to their threats”5.  
                                                 
4
  L. SHAYKHŪ, “Aɜ
amu āmmah”, al-Mashriq (February 1920), p. 136. 
5
  L. SHAYKHŪ, “Aɜ
amu āmmah”, al-Mashriq (February 1920), p. 471. Mercier in a 1914 
Christmas message told his flock that “the religion of the Church makes patriotism a law: there 
is no perfect Christian who is not a perfect patriot”, cit. in Hew STRACHAN, The First World 
War (Oxford, 2001), pp. 1117-1118. 
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Cardinal Mercier (1851-1926) had in 1882 been commissioned to 
inaugurate the chair of Thomistic philosophy created at the University of 
Louvain at the request of Pope Leo XIII. His Institut Superier de Philosophie 
there issued the Revue neo-Scholastique, which the learned Jesuit Shaykhū 
could have read before the war. Mercier’s reference to biology, physiology, 
neurology and the modern scientific and social disciplines would fit with the 
efforts of the al-Mashriq clericists to attach Europe’s (especially France’s) 
modern sciences to the religion. But Shaykhū’s fusion of the sacred with 
political resistance in Belgium saw no shadings to either Mercier or the polity 
and nationalism he represented. Mercier identified the concept of “la patrie” 
with which he fired Belgians during World War I unconditionally with a 
unitary Belgium defined by French: he had no concept of the mounting 
grievances of his country’s subordinated Dutch-speaking Flemings.6 
Linguistically repressive at home, that polity’s pitiless exploitation of the 
Congolese under King Leopold II (r. 1885-1908) had disturbed Europe and the 
U.S. even in that era. 
The harsh binary oppositions that Shaykhū and other Catholic Lebanese 
writers drew between despotic militarist, aggressive Germany and 
parliamentary, “free”, self-defending France and Belgium showed the capacity 
of an auxiliary language to block out shades and nuances in a far-off reality to 
which it gave access. Shaykhū did not fully understand that the French 
military, in order to get in the first blow, were as eager to thrust into neutral 
Belgium as their German peers. However, France’s Republican politicians did 
have more control (Britain’s civilian leaders had more again) over the military 
than did Germany’s civilian politicians and officials. 
Lebanon’s Catholic writers had not wholly dreamed up that France and 
Belgium’s nationalisms became more Catholic as those two nations resisted 
Germany. The departure of the secular state’s sometimes anti-Christian 
officials and teachers had shifted leadership and resistance in Belgium and 
Northern France to clerics and nuns whom German troops really could ill-treat 
in reprisals.7 The secular leaderships themselves and the clericists together 
now developed such cultural instruments as the Joan of Arc cult in inclusive 
ways that could unite all categories in the nation. The new association of 
Catholicism with political patriotism unfolding in the French language would 
feed accumulating bracketing of Religion and Homeland in the development of 
Lebanese particularist thought down the 1920s and 1930s. 
 
2. Images of other Allied States 
 
Apart from France, gigantic, modern America, and Russia, the clerical 
Lebanese writers scanned did not present very clear or solid accounts of most 
                                                 
6
  A.L. WYBLEMAN, “Mercier”, in Catholic Encyclopaedia (1967), pp. 671-672. 
7
  See H. STRACHAN, The First World War, pp. 1117-1118. 
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other pro-Entente countries fighting in the Allied camp as states, societies or 
cultures.  
 Shaykhū’s account blended the changing military situations of Russia with 
her cultural make-up. Her historical close racial relations with Serbia virtually 
forced her to enter the War when Austria issued her ultimatum.8 It was not just 
his dislike of new forms of self-assertion by “lower” classes or confiscation of 
property that made him denounce the Bolsheviks’ seizure of power: Shaykhū 
was disturbed by the looting of monasteries and destruction of churches that he 
had not dreamed up.9 
Insightful about linguistic, religious and class divisions that foredoomed 
the war effort of the Tsarist Empire, Shaykhū was more military and accepting 
of the formal state-entity in his overview of Italy’s participation in the War. 
Pope Pius X (1903-1914) had at last authorized local Catholics to vote in the 
Italian nationalist state with which his predecessors had struggled for forty 
years. Shaykhū duly swallowed the images of that shaky state that it had 
mobilized the masses of the population for the total war and that Italian high 
culture directed how people thought: “the poet Gabriele D’Annunzio raised up 
intrepid initiative in the people with his resounding odes so that the Italian 
armies surged forward as a torrential flood”. Shaykhū, though, did not ask how 
many Italians could have comprehended either D’Annunzio’s language or his 
almost proto-fascist nationalist concepts. 
Overall, Shaykhū believed that Italy had proven her mettle in her battles for 
mountainous terrain with more than a million Austro-Hungarian troops in 
1915-1918: the world that had had scant regard for Italy militarily now 
recognized the bravery and fortitude of her troops. Shaykhū gave a careful 
review of the swings of Rome’s foreign policy prior to her late entry in 1915. 
He repeated the official narrative that the Central States with whom she had 
been had not informed Italy that war was coming, as though she were of no 
account, and that Austria had derogated from her rights in the Balkans in 
conquering Serbia and moving against Albania. Austria had put off handing 
Trieste over to Italy, which duly jumped over to the states of the Triple 
Entente. Still, Shaykhū’s data showed Italy in undignified straits when in 1918 
Axis forces broke through to the plains to Venice and British and French 
forces had to come rushing.  
Although it traced some linkages between high culture, nationalism, state 
policy and territorial tensions in the region, Shaykhū’s account of Italy 
disappoints. It was very Catholic in a whimsical way: despite his rage against 
Germany and Turkey elsewhere, for him it was Divine providence that Italy’s 
government rightly stayed neutral for a time because that allowed the 
Cardinals of the world to come to “the capital of Catholicism” in 1914 to elect 
                                                 
8
  L. SHAYKHŪ, “Aɜ
amu āmmah”, al-Mashriq (February 1920), pp. 141-144. 
9
  L. SHAYKHŪ, “Al-Bulshufiyyūn” al-Mashriq (January 1920), pp. 47-54. 
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the successor to the just-deceased Pope Pius X. Most of “the Italian people” 
was hoping at that point that their state would stay neutral to the end of the 
War.10  
Shaykhū had glimpsed that the heterogeneity of the Tsarist empire 
foredoomed it to collapse in the War. As a West-attuned Jesuit who knew 
Italian high clerics in Lebanon-Syria, and given the secular-ameliorist 
nationalist Italian state’s past conflicts with the Church, he could have clamped 
some critical analysis down on the fragile unity of an Italian polity whose 
recently-incorporated populations spoke distinct languages, and many of 
whose troops in WW1 did not understand the meaning of even the term “Italy” 
for which they were being ordered to fight – the neo-“country” that was indeed 
the recent invention of a bourgeoisie.11 
Shaykhū did not grasp the cultural and kinship bonds that would draw the 
dominant U.S. groups towards the side of Britain during World War I. Given 
the profitability of the munitions the U.S. was selling to all the parties, 
Americans had never conceived that they might enter the War, he imaged. 
Then the German High Command in 1917 launched indiscriminate submarine 
warfare against all international shipping, even that of neutral states, gambling 
that cutting Triple Entente supplies to France could bring a swift victory. As 
Shaykhū observed, the sinkings enraged most peoples, “in particular the 
Americans given their pride and drive to preserve the freedom of nations for 
                                                 
10
  L. SHAYKHŪ, “Aɜ
amu āmmah”, al-Mashriq (August 1920), pp. 628-632. 
11
  L. SHAYKHŪ, “Aɜ
amu āmmah”, al-Mashriq (August 1920), pp. 628-632.. For many of the 
troops’ incomprehension of even the name “Italy”, see Paul CORNER, “The Italian Experience 
of World War I: National Formation or National Disintegration?”, paper read at the 
‘International Conference on the First World War as Remembered in the Countries of the 
Eastern Mediterranean’, German Institute for Oriental Studies Beirut, 28 April 2001. Latin, as 
much as the book-language of Dante, Boccaccio and Petrarch, had been the shared literary 
language of the areas that were proclaimed as “Italy” in 1861: thus, such languages as Sicilian 
and Sardinian remained dominant until cinema and TV and classrooms ended them from the 
late 1950s. Ernest Pulgram (1958) opted to “speak of Italian dialects rather than languages, 
perhaps for no better reason than that all of Italy once was and now is again a political unit, and 
does possess a national standard language”— which is to ignore the almost millenium and a 
half of disparate political units and birth of discrete languages that had intervened between the 
collapse of Roman power and the re-proclamation of the unit “Italy” in 1861. See Ernest 
PULGRAM, The Tongues of Italy: Prehistory and History (Harvard, 1958), p. 46. As Italy’s 
Minister of Education Martini had wisecracked back in 1896, “Italy has now been created: it 
remains to make the Italians”: Gilles PECOUT, “Politisation et integration nationale en italie: les 
campagnes toscannes des anees 1860”, Revue Historique (January-March 2001), p. 84. 
However, there were no political movements in Sicily or Sardinia to secede from Italy at the 
time Shaykhū wrote, in contrast to the tensions he registered in the Tsarist empire: regional 
nationalisms in Italy only came following WW2. Communication from Dr John HAJEK, Head 
of Department of French and Italian Studies at Melbourne University, Australia, 22 November 
2001.  
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which they are noted”, leading President Wilson to declare war on Germany on 
2 April 1917. Shaykhū voiced more indignation against President Wilson for 
earlier pursuing a peace supposedly favorable to Germany, and for her 
slowness to join the War, than he had towards the state of sacred Rome. But he 
praised the 1,428,000 American troops who finally landed in France: once 
French CIC General Joffre trained them, they fought the Germans “with rare 
courage as though French honor had materialized in them” – a strong 
compliment from Shaykhū when the context was France’s survival. Perhaps 
the Americans were thanking France on the soil of Europe for the aid she had 
once given America for its original winning of its independence – a motif that 
would have been fostered in Shaykhū by long-standing French literary 
discourse. 
President Wilson, though, had “somewhat muddied his glory by issuing 
unclear statements about liberating the nations and granting them 
independence”: Shaykhū feared that the unleashing of national demands could 
bring destruction and catastrophes worse than those of the last war.12 Here 
Shaykhū was wary of the claims of Arab nationalisms or entities wider than 
Lebanon, a novel, controversial polity. 
Shaykhū and al-Mashriq’s analyses of WW1 were bounded by statal 
cultures, conventional patterns of diplomatic interactions, formal military 
balances between states and the degrees of courage of given armies – ethos – 
as determinants of the outbreak and outcomes of wars. Still, the economic 
explications of some French and British writers and perhaps even from the 
socialist and Communist enemy could also figure. Shaykhū described the War 
as “economic more than a matter of international relations [since] Germany 
ignited it only in order to expand its territories and to open markets for its 
commerce,” – which could point to pacifist counter-discourses in Britain (eg. 
Norman Angell) that Britain’s economic exclusion forced Germany to go to 
war.13 Shaykhū observed that the Kaiser had some grounds for his hopes in the 
leadup that the British might stay out of the War because of “their concern for 
their trade: war would expand it and guarantee huge profits because it would 
freeze the trades of the combatant powers”14 
Thus, Shaykhū sometimes ascribed economic motives to the choices and 
actions of states. Moreover, he and his colleagues hoped that the French 
mandate they championed would bring economic modernization and profits to 
Lebanon. 
 
 
                                                 
12
  L. SHAYKHŪ, “Aɜ
amu āmmah”, al-Mashriq (Aug. 1920), pp. 632-633. 
13
  L. SHAYKHŪ on V. SHCHEWISH, La Transsaharien et la le premier Transafricain (Tunis 1916), 
in al-Mashriq (March 1920), pp. 231-232.  
14
  L. SHAYKHŪ, “Aɜ
amu āmmah”, al-Mashriq (April 1920), p. 288. 
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3. Conzeptualization of Germans 
 
Wilhelmian Germany became more and more unattractive to pro-clerical 
Maronites well before WW1 because of its tightening alliance with the central 
government in Constantinople that from 1908 was usually led by the 
Committee of Union and Progress (CUP). The new Young Turk elite gave 
much more scope to threatening secular ideas throughout the whole Empire 
than had Sultan ɜAbdul-Hamīd with whom Maronite Patriarch Ilyās al-
	uwayyik had built up a live-and-let-live alliance in which he conceivably 
may have helped the Ottoman government repress local Maronite secularists.15 
The CUP also had centralizing impulses, and Germany was helping it improve 
its military capacities: as soon as they brought the Ottoman State into the War, 
the CUP militarily ended Mountain Lebanon’s autonomy. After WW1, 
Christian authors in Arabic rapped “Germany, the aider of Turkey” for 
“allowing” sweeping violence by Turks, Kurds and Circassians against 
[mainly Syriac-speaking and Armenian] Christians in Mesopotamia and [in 
today’s Turkey] Diyar Bakr, Mardin, Tur ‘Abdin etc during the War – 
criminality by association rather than having taken part.16 
More forward-thinking voices from among even the ranks of the vengeful 
French themselves were nudging Lebanon’s Catholics to a more sympathetic 
understanding of the deep harm the late conflict and the post-War reparations 
had caused to Germany as well. The Alsatian-French author Got had reached 
the conclusion in his on-site researches with the French Mission in Berlin that 
Germany would never be able to lift itself to its feet again, however favorable 
conditions might become, except after long years given the reparations it had 
to pay back to the Allies as compensation for everything it had destroyed in 
other countries. Thus, the Treaty of Versailles had to be revised.17 (Got was 
overly pessimistic: the German currency was to restabilize in 1923, and the 
following year the Allies agreed to evacuate the Ruhr and grant Germany a 
more realistic payment schedule for reparations: by 1927, German industry had 
regained its 1913 high, but then the Great Depression hit all the world). 
 
4. Connections through Catholicism to Germans 
 
Catholic universalism finally reasserted itself – if weakly – over the French 
nationalism given a Christian patina, to which their auxiliary language had 
opened these clerical Lebanese. In one brief note, Shaykhū did rap “some 
                                                 
15
  Dennis WALKER, “The Relations of Catholic Maronite Patriarch Ilyās Burus al-	uwayyik 
with the Ottoman Turks”, Islamochristiana 28 (2002), pp. 109-123. 
16
  Review of the 509-page book al-Quārā fī nakabāt al-naārā, in al-Mashriq (January 1920), 
pp. 71-72. Dr Gabriele YONAN of Germany was in 2000 researching links between Wilhelmian 
ministries and military and Ottoman attacks on Syriac-speakers during WW1. 
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  Review by Fr. Gabriel LEVENQ of (Dr) Ambroise GOT’s L’Allemagne après la Débâcle 
(Strasbourg, 1919), in al-Mashriq (July 1920), p. 553. 
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extremists” in the victorious Allied powers who were expelling Catholic 
German missionaries from their Third World missions “lest, it is contended, 
they misuse religious evangelization as a means to propagate… love towards 
their homeland”. Shaykhū added his “weak voice” to that of the Pope and 
others to protest at restrictions that were further depriving a number of lands of 
the blessings of evangelizing “Christian civilization”, given that the World 
War had cut down so many missionaries. The Allies could still try any 
Germans charged to have deformed the religion into an instrument for 
temporal aims, so alien to the thinking of Catholic missionaries.18 [As though 
some Francophone Western missionaries had not inculcated love of the French 
state in the Fertile Crescent!] 
In 1922, the science-aware Rafāɛīl Nakhlah al-Yasūɜī tried to supplement or 
modify the hostile image of Germany that the French language had so deeply 
implanted in the opinion-makers of “the Catholics of the East” whom he now 
addressed. Nakhlah voiced understanding of the hatred that came from all 
corners against the people of the “covetous” Wilhelm II from its brilliant 
triumph in the 1870 war with France to its igniting of the flames of the late 
World War that had spread death and destruction over all areas of Europe. He 
took issue, though, with some who “have exaggeratedly dismissed Germany as 
in its entirety a purely materialist civilization that uses intellectual powers or 
the progress of the sciences and arts only to increase material prosperity and to 
expand the country by violating the rights of neighboring nations.” In 
correction [to this Catholic view of Germany in the Arabic lands], Nakhlah 
highlighted as an instance of “real eternal civilization – justice, mercy [religion 
and ethics]” – in German life the association of Catholic pupils in German 
secondary schools, the Neudeutschland or Young Germany, founded 
immediately after the War and which by 1922 now had 25,000 members. 
Resolved to spread “Chastity” in “insolent” Weimar Germany, the students 
[like the clericists in France-mandated Lebanon] fought all that could foster 
promiscuity and prostitution in literature, cinema, theatre, public art, and 
fashions.19  
Bismarck’s – Protestantism-motivated? – Kulturkampf against Catholic 
schools was in the memory of Lebanon’s Catholics when WW1 came. The less 
France-bound Nakhlah, who had some real Catholic universalism, liked Jesuit-
directed Young Germany’s stress on science beside religion. This and its 
retention of Homeland at the side of religion helped shape predilections now 
being passed on to the Maronite discursive tradition. (Some Germans were to 
assess long afterwards that such Catholic German youth movements and 
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  L. SHAYKHU, review of J. Neuhaesler, Appel aux catholiques de l’univers pour sauver les 
missions allemandes (Munster 1920), in al-Mashriq (July 1920), pp. 554-555. 
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  Rafāɛīl NAKHLAH SJ, “Almāniyā al-fatāt: aw jamɜiyyat al-alabat al-kāthūlīk”, al-Mashriq (July 
1922), 626-641.  
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schools paved the way to the conversion of their middle-class youths to 
Nazism because they taught nationality and sniped at the urban, pluralist 
society of modernity emerging under Weimar).20 
Rafāɛīl Nakhlah hoped, wrongly, that Germany could be redeemed into a 
polity in which Catholicism could flourish after the War. Yet, WW1 had made 
most literate Maronites swallow whole for the long term French nationalism’s 
hatred of Germany, albeit with some adaption to clericist priorities. The 
Catholic clerical media in Lebanon mainly supported the most hard-line 
French positions towards Germany well into the 1920s. In early 1923, al-
Bashīr rapped strikes by miners, boycotts and passive resistance against the 
French occupation in the Ruhr, and claims that by seizing coal mines and 
factories France had paralysed commerce and industry there. In refutation, al-
Bashīr set out the assessments of the French ultrist politicians. In occupying 
the Ruhr after WW1, France had only been matching Germany, which in 1870 
occupied provinces of France that she only evacuated after getting reparations 
for her losses in that war. France had to protect herself lest Germany catch her 
off-guard again.21 Militarism: al-Bashīr excerpted accusations by War Minister 
Maginot in the French parliament that Germany was trying to rebuild its 
forces. Thus, France had to apply conscription to build a strong army of 52 
divisions with “brutal” budgetary allocations.22 
The high drama of France’s struggle for survival in WW1 implanted in the 
literate discourse of the Maronites and Melkites many anti-German motifs 
from French nationalism. Some Lebanese Christian writers remained jumpy in 
the 1920s that the violence and mayhem of World War I could resume at any 
time. They continued to worry about France’s safety from the expansionism of 
Germany, towards which they would remain suspicious and hostile in its Nazi 
period, in common with Muslim liberal intellectuals in Egypt and the Fertile 
Crescent. 
By 1920, a friends-enemies dichotomy – “liberal” France versus militarist, 
post-Christian Germany – had been set for the long term into the Lebanese 
Catholic ethos. 
 
4. World War I’s Impact upon Ideology 
 
The havoc of WWI was assessed – or experienced – by many in Lebanon 
as an end of hope and of meaning in history. Preceding assumptions among 
Lebanon’s Catholics that God or alternatively Progress (both as conceptualized 
from Europe) would order history towards human welfare faced a severe 
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  Friedrich HEER, Revolutions of Our Time (London, 1974), p. 60. 
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  “Mushkilat al-Ruhr: ma al-arīqah ilā alli-hā?”, al-Bashīr (24 March 1923), p. 1; “Fī l-Ruhr”, 
al-Bashīr (24 March 1923), p. 1. 
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  “Faransā turīdu jayshaha qawiyyan: inna-hu khayru aman li-awn al-salām”, al-Bashīr (10 
March 1923), p. 1. 
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challenge from the death of millions. Clericist Catholic ideologues had to 
restructure Catholic Christianity to make it prevent or contain future conflict. 
The War had similarly devastated secular world-views in the Arab East. The 
Western states that had claimed to stand for Enlightenment, rationality and 
Progress had shown their capacity for atavistic devastation against each other. 
Thus, Lebanese and other Arab quasi-secularists now searched for 
supplementary meanings from established religions, although mostly in a 
theosophical way.  
As disrespect spread in the world towards European states and cultures, the 
Maronite clerical writers had to respond to the maneuverings of Muslim 
apologists, the Arab theosophists and freemasons and the Arab post-Christian 
anti-clerics to highlight their creeds, not Catholicism, as the solutions to 
conflict. Both post-Christian radical secularists and modernist salafi Islamists 
had long cited the crusader wars and the Inquisition as past violence and terror 
by the Church of Rome. An al-Mashriq article by Fr. Butrus Faraj ufayr, 
“The Church and Resistance to Wars” welcomed that a group of eminent 
Englishmen were launching a League of Religions. Its ambition was to 
organize spiritual forces in the world to strengthen general peace and the joint 
interests of nations. Al-Mashriq recognized among those attending the England 
conference names of people representing different religions and sects, bishops 
and rabbis, as well as major thinkers and people working for social reform. 
“Those who in ancient and modern history worked most to end wars, or at least 
lessen their horrors, were the men of religion, and in particular the high clerics 
of the most widespread religion in the world, the Catholic Church”.  
Fr. ufayr had partly penned his article out of fury at an essay by the West-
acculturated Indian Syed Ameer ɜAlī (1849-1928), translated in Egypt’s 
journal al-Bayān, which had striven to contrast Islam to the failure of 
Christianity after the Roman Empire adopted it to at all lessen the horrors of 
wars, oppression and extermination: Christianity had refused to address issues 
of international relations and reciprocal duties between nations. ufayr retorted 
that Jesus set up the Church in the first place as the mechanism to establish in 
this world, after He ascended, his social teachings, and peace in given societies 
and in international relations. As Paul had put it, there no more remained 
amongst those who accepted Christ Jew nor Greek, not slave nor freeman, 
neither male nor female: all of them have become equal and one in the 
Messiah (Galatians 3:28). ufayr cited NT verses that exhorted to forbearing 
pacifism even towards enemies. He challenged the Islamic apologists to muster 
for Islam clear verses on that level.  
Far from being part of past or recent violence in Europe, the Church and its 
Popes had always acted as the arbitrator to decide between kings and princes 
whose proclivities could have ignited war and social conflict, retorted ufayr. 
In the middle ages, popes in Rome, when they saw ill-treatment by some Kings 
against their subjects, defended those who had been oppressed without any 
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fear of the power that those tyrants exercized. Henry IV, the Emperor of 
Germany who ignited in Europe a war that inflicted catastrophes on its lands, 
finally was forced to submit and desist before the wise old man of Rome. 
This characterization by ufayr ignored that Pope Gregory VII (1073-85) 
was no such wise arbitrator who only intervened to bridle kings after they 
became violent and expansionist or repressive at home. Rather, it was the 
simultaneous drives of both he and Henry IV to expand their respective power-
systems that drew them to their collisions. Gregory may have founded the 
Papacy’s long-term supremacy over the Catholic churches and its claim to 
supervize the secular rulers of Europe, but in his life-time his drive to reduce 
kings to vassals sparked grotesque situations of double-popes and alternative 
kings or emperors for Germany and fighting and looting in holy Rome that far 
from fostered peace or stability or any regard for religion and the Church. 
ufayr argued that the papacy carried its immemorial arbitrative role in 
international high politics forward into modern history when its mediation by 
Pope Leo XIII in 1885 settled the conflict that developed between Germany 
and Spain over the Caroline Islands. Given the Church’s track-record in 
settling a host of disputes and wars, the League of Nations should incorporate 
it into modern peacemaking, ending the sidelining. “Would not the world have 
avoided all the terrors and hatreds of the last World War, had Austria and 
Serbia both taken to the Holy See the issues of that conflict that set off all 
these wars and caused so much suffering?” Thus, ufayr fleeted over the extent 
to which the international Catholic church had been cut down, sidelined, 
marginalized and hit by 19th century secularist, anti-clerical or downrightly 
anti-Christian regimes in Europe and Latin America that were determined to 
transform their national societies and their world standing without any 
trammels or meddling from the Church. 
Lebanon’s clericists remained on the defensive against Arab secularists 
who held up modern Europe’s secularism. But ufayr sought in the late War a 
religious imperative in history. “All the development of modern sciences only 
turned them into a terrible instrument that have made War unprecedentedly 
barbarous and destructive”. Thus, only religions could bring the natures of 
people under control. 
ufayr rebutted the charges from Islamists and Christian-born Arab free-
thinkers that the church had itself committed or incited military aggressions. 
The popes had maintained properties to sustain the church, and this 
understandably led to the creation of a state which the Pope of Rome then had 
to defend by force if it were invaded. (Answering radically secular Italian 
nationalists?) The crusader wars and those of the European states against the 
expansionist Ottoman Empire were only defensive and proportionate. The 
Muslims themselves [= Arab nationalists including his bete noire Rashīd Riā, 
Egypto-Syrian editor of al-Manār] as well as the Christians had condemned 
the Ottoman Empire. Still, charges of the Arab free-thinkers and such salafists 
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as Ridā and his mentor Muhammad ɜAbduh and the acculturated Muslim 
apologists about the “fanatical” crusades and Inquisition had cut close to 
home.23  
We should not overrate ecumenical glimmerings in Fr. ufayr that 
devastation in the late War now could force clergy of varied religions to work 
together. ufayr might indeed accept even the odd token rabbi, but he voiced 
no sense that Muslim clerics might have to be inducted into the peace-making, 
or that Lebanon’s Catholics had anything to learn from the Islam massively 
flowing around them.  
ufayr’s semi-quietist passages that religion and the Church could only 
ameliorate, not end, social injustice could have been closer to Christianity’s 
New Testament and sense of original sin. But the WW1 havoc and the taunts 
from the Islamists had pushed him to make Jesus the founder of International 
Law as he claimed a role for the Catholic Church in international relations and 
politics like that that Islam’s modernists were now imaging for Islam. 
It needed strenuous footwork to deny after 1918 that Christianity and its 
institutions had failed to motivate its adherents in Europe and the West 
towards peace and constructive solutions. Catholic writers and media in 
Lebanon were restructuring Catholicism in order to maintain it, but many felt 
that other instruments and groups had to be synthesized with Christianity to 
save humanity. Thus, al-Mashriq also gave a hearing to the new international 
mechanism of the League of Nations, more neutral and secular than the 
Church, which it saw as set up by governments in response to pressure from 
the populations that had lost so much blood. The author, Emile Tayyān, was a 
student at the French Law School who was to become a lecturer in Law at St 
Joseph’s College. In 1920, the young Tayyān was in places Francophile in a 
way conventional among Maronites at that time. France had acted rightly to 
exclude Germany from the League of Nations following World War I: a 
League meant to promote freedom and justice and the observance of 
international undertakings could not admit states that had constantly broken 
their contracts and undertakings and barbarically swooped down upon others 
[= Germany’s invasion of Belgium and France]. Since actions by the League 
had to be adopted in advance by unanimous vote, it had been right to exclude 
such states as Germany and Soviet Russia that it had to control. 
In places, though, Tayyān’s youthful essay diverged from the battered 
secular-ameliorist ideology of the French State whose language he loved. 
Intentionally or not, he might have been feeding the reaction among Christian 
Lebanese against Westerners in general in the wake of WW1, sparked by 
international realpolitik, contempt from French personnel and military in 
Lebanon, and by cultural incompatibility. In a critique of a range of Western 
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states, not just Germany alone, Tayyān condemned the colonialist 
expansionism that Britain had carried forward through WW1 and the League 
structure itself. He feared that her takeover of Germany’s former colonies (eg. 
South West Africa and Cameroon) with the League’s ratification would 
become permanent since none of its texts gave it either the title or the means to 
supervise and end such supposed “protectorates” or “trusteeships”. Even if the 
League had such a function nominally, who was there to compel the imperial 
state to withdraw from a trustee territory as its population became more able to 
govern itself? While dislike of Britain and being Francophile could go together 
in the 1920s, Tayyān then denounced Rome as a precursor of “civilized” states 
bent on conquests in his day. The nature of human beings has not changed for 
thousands of years: the ancient Romans when they conquered a town, 
depriving it of its liberty, used to then term it free or allied. “We only hope that 
the new words will amount to more than a veil”. Whatever his exact intention, 
Tayyān had got very close here to France which presented herself as the Latin 
successor of imperial Rome in the Levant after WW1.24  
Most groups of literate Lebanese Catholics had the strong bond of language 
to the thought and the survival of France. Yet many writers at least sometimes 
hinted edginess towards the hierarchical imperialism of the Western states. 
WW1 had shown again that constructive ideologies articulated from the West 
might not be able to contain violence and evil, or its Catholic and secular 
streams be synthesized. 
 
PERCEPTIONS OF WW1 CONFLICTS IN THE OTTOMAN EMPIRE 
 
1. The War in Lebanon 
 
1.1. The Functions of the Indigenous Martyrs 
 
The formal execution or murder by some Turks of Catholic or Muslim 
Lebanese/Syrians shortly before or during World War I could define in two 
ways the indigenous nation-community that the clericists would henceforth 
strive to achieve. On one hand, if the items defined the Turks as Muslim and 
the victims as Christian, the events could alienate the Christian readership 
from not just the Turks but from Muslim Arabs of the Syrian interior and 
longer littoral. In the other direction, if Muslim Arab victims were also 
perceived as covictims because of the literary Arabic they shared with the 
Maronites, then that could foster political community with wider Islamo-Arab 
populations – and perhaps Lebanon’s affiliation to some pan-Syrian or pan-
Arab entity.  
Of the two possibilities, most items on pre-1918 Catholic victims that al-
Mashriq carried fostered Lebanonism, but in an incomplete way. al-Mashriq 
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published a retrospect in 1921 on the lives and execution of the two brothers 
Filīb and Farīd al-Khāzin (from a feudal family). It represented Filīb al-Khāzin 
(1865-1916) as from his youth having protested abuses of the Turks under the 
mutasarrif Wasa Pasha (governed Mountain Lebanon 1883-1892) from the 
Egyptian press. Once the French Consul appointed Filīb an honorary 
dragoman, the two brothers were emboldened to launch the newspaper al-Arz 
(The Cedar) which fiercely defended not just Lebanon’s internationally-
guaranteed autonomy but, perhaps equally, the ancient “sacred rights” (al-
uqūq al-muqaddasah) of the protector France in the homeland. When Italy 
seized Libya from the Ottoman Empire, its armored cruisers sank two Ottoman 
torpedo ships in Beirut harbour. Filīb’s lament at that time was that it had not 
been done by France, which alone among the Powers had the right to conduct 
such actions “in these lands”. Clearly, the Ottoman central government one 
day might have more to fear from the pair than words or editorializing, but the 
early perspective of al-Mashriq in 1921 was of a recent Ottoman system in 
which the printed page could muster immense political power in itself and thus 
had to be controlled or repressed. The al-Mashriq retrospect speculated that it 
was the publication by the brothers in several volumes of Arabic translations 
of the correspondence between the Powers establishing France’s maternal role 
and rights in Lebanon that made Jamāl Pasha, the last Turkish governor of 
Syria, decide to execute Filīb and Farīd. 
The martyrs who sacrifice their lives for the particularist homeland are 
simultaneously sustained by a Christianity acculturated to the Catholicism of 
Europe’s Latin peoples, eg. France. The two brothers had expected from the 
first day of the sitting of the court that it would sentence them to death as it had 
all others. They were sustained in jail as they prepared themselves for their 
final journey to their Creator and that other “heavenly Homeland” by their 
regular reading of Thomas Akempis’ The Imitation of Christ, as well as prayer 
and meditation. There was a touch of hagiography in some details of the last 
weeks of the al-Khāzin brothers: for example their refusal to eat more than the 
needed minimum of the prison fare so that they could donate the rest to the 
poor.  
In regard to current political context and functions, the al-Mashriq tribute 
was stylizing the death of Filīb and Farīd al-Khāzin to make it of use in the 
mobilization of Maronite audiences to the side of France in the ideologically 
much less clear-cut situation that was developing as France’s imposition of her 
non-pious rule hit the Arabic culture, the political dignity and the solid, simple 
Christian religious values of the Maronites. French mandatory rule was turning 
out to be not quite the expected liberation or Pan-Catholic conjunction with a 
Christian protector. At least some Maronites had been showing signs since 
1918 of now wanting to distance France by some sort of linkage to hinterland 
Muslim Syrian Arabs in a polity to be centered around Damascus. Ritual 
commemoration of model martyrs oriented to Latin Catholicism and to France 
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could help contain such swings among al-Mashriq’s elite readership. 
Greater political openness to Muslims in a context of the reaction against 
France after 1918 would be no new thing for Maronites or Melkites. Before 
1914, various secular-minded groups (and Maronite Patriarch Ilyās Burus al-
	uwayyik before 1908 and CUP rule) had at points sought closer political 
relations with Turks and/or Muslim Arabs in the sprawling, potentially 
lucrative Ottoman Empire. Such subversive precursors of affiliation to the 
Arab lands at expense of France had to be excised from Lebanon’s history. 
The Francophile particularists mustered the strong narrative of suffering and 
martyrdom for God and Homeland to nullify the plurality of pre-1914 
Lebanese Catholic history and ideologies. For a range of Catholics, 
martyrdoms during World War I finally showed the impossibility of affiliating 
to at least some Muslims in a political community, with distancing of the 
West’s Christian powers, which integrative Ottomanism by some Maronites 
had already tried. 
The (pre-WW1) memory that enraged the writer most was “the day that 
Lebanese faction rose up in the wake of the proclamation of the Ottoman 
constitution [after the CUP coup of 1908] to insist that Lebanon had to elect 
representatives to represent it in the [restored] Turkish parliament” in Istanbul. 
In this, the secularist-Ottomanist faction among the Maronites was being 
manipulated by Turkish officials and politicians to “deny Lebanon its 
independence and thereby prevent the European states from intervening in the 
affairs of this land/these lands” (hādhihi-l-bilād). The two al-Khāzin brothers 
blocked “those of the other doctrine” with the “unrelenting” (but not very 
physical) war they waged from their newspaper al-Arz. Their “logical” 
territorial nationalism (waaniyyah) presented legally airtight refutations: 
sending representatives to Constantinople would have violated Lebanon’s 
autonomy ("self-independence") granted under a Constitution guaranteed by 
the great powers. 
The holy blood of the saint-particularists whom Jamāl martyred opened the 
way to dismiss those who had worked for a humane political community with 
Ottoman Muslims as materialist opportunists in contrast. Yet these very 
denunciations underscored institutions and processes that had been operating 
to integrate Muslim Turks, Muslim Arabs, and Arabic Christians prior to the 
War and the martyrdoms. Archbishop ɜAbdallāh al-Khūrī’s 1921 elegy 
denounced “public posts (al-wazāɛif) that make people remiss from serious 
work, inclining them to prefer personal interest over the collective interest. 
Everyone knows how widespread this disease became in Turkey and 
Lebanon”. But, the pure love of the two brothers for their homeland had made 
them spurn all posts the government offered to win their silence about its evil 
deeds. The two brothers’ construction of patriotism (al-waaniyyah) only 
allowed them to court the protection of France which alone would actualize the 
homeland’s interest.  
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Al-Mashriq imaged that the blood of the martyrs ended any possibility of 
some humane political community with Turks. For this, the Archbishop 
defined the group the two martyrs defended as Christian – yet it did not so fuse 
the Turkish enemy with Islam as to include Arab Muslims. The sufferings of 
Arabic, Syriac and Armenian Christians during World War 1 could activate 
ideas that would polarize those all together against Muslims in general or 
Islam. But the anti-Turkism of 1920s clericist-Catholic Lebanese writings that 
reconstructed memories of WW1 repression, martyrdom and suffering to fuel a 
new nationhood could keep up some affiliation to the hinterland’s Arab 
Muslims. A sense that Syrian and other Muslim Arabs had been colleagues 
with Lebanese Christians in a joint linguistic-cum-ethnic coalition against the 
Turks in the wide Ottoman Empire was still vivid in al-Mashriq’s 1921 tribute 
to “the two martyrs of Lebanon.” 
 As soon as their interrogation began, Archbishop ɜAbdallah al-Khūrī 
wrote, Filīb and his brother knew that they were heading for the same fate as 
“an elite of the [leading] men of Syria and Lebanon who were detained with 
them, and who were driven either to Damascus (al-Shām) or to Beirut for 
sentences of execution to be carried out against them – figures like [Muslims] 
Shafīq al-Muɛayyad and ɜAbd al-	amīd al-Zahrāwī whose bravery and 
preparedness to sacrifice their lives for the suffering homeland the Syrians will 
long remember. By the blood of those heroes the land [or lands – al-bilād] won 
title to be purified of the Turkish element” [= Ottoman phraseology] “and the 
corruptions it wrought”. True, the Catholic writer remained aware of the 
separateness of faith of those recent allies. However, he felt obliged to “richly 
praise the patriotism of our Arab Muslim brothers who – despite their religious 
bonds with the Turks – were not deceived by their lying promises but kept up 
their fury at the injustices and terrible crimes they committed.” Jamāl Pasha’s 
ill-advised repression dug “a deep ravine that irreversibly separated the two 
[Ottoman] elements/ethnic groups (al-ɜunsurayn)”. 
In this sector, the tribute to the two bearers of the standard of ultra-
particularism and a sort of spiritual fusion with France, does have a sense of 
commonality in the face of the Turks at least that could blur the nation in 
Lebanon out into some wider Arab political nation. The memorization of 
martydom here could activate the sense of al-ɜArab as a cherished wide 
classical community in which Fr. Lūwīs Shaykhū had stressed the membership 
and roles of many Christians. This quicksilver margin of the tribute to the two 
al-Khāzin brothers could veer either way – to Lebanese particularism or to a 
wider Arab linguistic nationalism. This was, though, a margin.25  
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2. Patriarch Ilyas Burus al-	uwayyik versus Jamāl Pasha 
 
During his 1922 account of Armenian suffering and death that he 
witnessed, the Maronite Yūzif Tawtal already termed Jamāl, the Ottoman 
governor of Syria during WW1, as “Jamāl Pasha the Murderer” (al-Saffāh), the 
epithet that would henceforth accompany his name in Lebanonist and Arabist 
nationalist discourses.26  
During WW1, Jamāl Pasha as governor of Syria was intent to modify 
procedures to symbolize a partial shift of power from the Maronite church and 
from Mount Lebanon’s autonomous institutions towards himself and the 
Ottoman central government. The Empire’s central Turkish authorities had 
abolished the capitulations; Jamāl sent his troops into Mountain Lebanon and 
at one point imposed a blockade that starved many ordinary people there. The 
food-blockade came at a high-point of a long personal trial of wills between 
him and the Maronite Patriarch Ilyās Burus al-	uwayyik (appointed in 1899): 
Jamāl’s troops were in the Jabal (Mountain Lebanon) but he did not disarm the 
Maronite population, conscript them widely or prohibit them from leaving it: 
this suggests that he meant to let food flow in again if al-	uwayyik made 
some gestures of subordination, which the Patriarch inventively avoided as 
long or as much as he could. 
In early 1922, Archbishop ɜAbdallāh al-Khūrī published in the Jesuit-
founded newspaper al-Bashīr a defence of stances that al-	uwayyik had 
adopted towards Jamāl during the War. al-Khūrī conceded that a section of the 
Maronites felt that the Patriarch had shown weakness at one point of his 
protracted confrontation with the man who symbolized Turkish rule when in 
October 1916 he signed a statement to the effect that Jamāl had treated the 
populations of Lebanon and Syria well, particularly the Christians. [The well-
attended demonstrations after 1918 for a Greater Lebanon unit under French 
tutelage were in part upward pressure from Maronite sectors that had been 
radicalized by the war-time suffering: it was not just that the Patriarch 
organized them]. 
Yet, while ɜAbdallāh’s 1922 memorization did not focus that aspect, it 
looks from his data that Jamāl had been acting in geographical Syria without 
much control or monitoring from Constantinople. ɜAbdallāh, an intermediary 
for al-	uwayyik to Jamāl, recalled the latter as seeking written statements 
from local Christian leaders to counter articles appearing in the French press in 
1916 that “the Turks” were determined to starve the Christian people to 
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extinction in Lebanon and Syria, “that he had set up gallows” – the latter was 
the simple truth –, “and that the Maronites were eagerly awaiting the arrival of 
the French so that they could join them and expel the Turks and turn their 
country into a French colony”. Such international reports had apprised the 
CUP leaders away in the capital that Jamāl had so alienated all the Syrians, the 
Muslims perhaps even more than the Christians, as to make their discontent 
threaten the Ottoman State’s hold in those lands. Jamāl Pasha’s repeated 
efforts to force Patriarch al-	uwayyik into rituals of respect towards the 
Ministry of Religious Affairs in Istanbul that all non-Maronite Christian clerics 
accepted were to assure his faraway CUP superiors that his provinces were 
non-rebellious and quasi-normal. 
Maronite clericist negotiators were concerned with their position and that 
of their populations before Turkish power. During the discussions with Jamāl 
on behalf of the Patriarch, ɜAbdallah replied that newspapers during wars strive 
to blacken the reputations of the enemy states. But the numbers of Lebanese 
people really were falling because at least 50,000 had died in the famine and 
with Lebanon now on the threshold of winter much food would have to be 
brought in by its close or the country would lose half its population. In al-
Khūrī’s narrative, the statement of good treatment from Governor Jamāl that 
the Patriarch would now sign was the latter’s response to the existential crisis 
of Maronites in general that was now forcing him to negotiate and concede. 
In the real past, Jamāl was rather pro-French culturally and he may have 
regretted the CUP’s entry of WW1 on the German side.27 But for the Patriarch, 
and for his subordinate Archbishop ɜAbdallah in his 1922 memorization, the 
connection with France was both a threat to the Maronites given the mood of 
the hard-pressed Turks, and a proud emblem of identity they flaunted in their 
face. When Jamāl questioned Maronite loyalty to the Ottoman state, ɜAbdallah 
responded that France had out of “love” of the Christians established many 
institutions in Lebanon such as the theological college in which he had learnt. 
The Maronites had duly loved her back, but, ɜAbdallah told Jamāl, that love 
had far from fostered in him “any inclination on my part for my country to 
become a French colony”. When Jamāl voiced the same concern of loyalty to 
the Patriarch in a meeting on 21 July 1915, al-	uwayyik similarly put the 
relationship with benefactor France within a frame of the Maronites’ adhesion 
to the Ottoman State – which may have been his real stance up to 1908. 
Jamāl Pasha was concerned in 1916 with his deteriorating standing in 
Istanbul, or his place in world Francophone history or perhaps how he would 
fare before some trial by the Allies if they won. He refuted at length images in 
the French press that could be construed to link him to an artificial famine. He 
rhetorically asked ɜAbdallah if he had sent the locusts in 1915 or stopped rain 
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from falling in 1916 or organized the sea blockade by the Allied navies that cut 
off the flow of food and funds from the Syrian diaspora? He now sounded 
eager to shower the Patriarch with grain, and did get the letter of 
commendation out of him that the Maronite side assumed would be understood 
in Europe and the Americas as having been coerced.28  
ɜAbdallah al-Khūrī in 1922 had characterized the non-Muslim Lebanese in 
religious terms as Christian vis-à-vis Jamāl and the Turks. Going further, fairly 
secularist-liberal historian Yūsuf Muɜawwad (c. 2000) interpreted Jamāl/the 
Turks as motivated by a Muslim communalism seen as having persisted among 
elite Ottoman Turks amid their Westernization: Jamāl was trying to maintain 
the ancient pattern of relations of “dominant and dominated, people of the 
majority and those tolerated, Muslim and dhimmi” – a late echo of themes in 
the Mandate-period early Katāɛib. For Muɜawwad here, the conflict was not 
originated by issues articulated by the two men such as new taxes or whether 
or not the Ottomans should disarm or conscript the Christians: rather, the 
Ottoman officer Jamāl was mustering pressures and issues to bring the dhimmi 
to heel and call him to order.29 Archbishop al-Khūrī did not formally 
characterize Jamāl’s maneuvers thus in 1922 soon after the events, but many 
Maronites in the 20th century saw such a dhimmifying ethos constructed upon 
Islam as determining the attitudes of Turks and Muslim Arabs to Lebanon’s 
Catholics. Tendencies in early mandate-period Catholic memorization to 
denounce oppressive Turks in terms of Islam were contained by the sober al-
	uwayyik’s lack of much animus against that religion, and by Lebanese 
Catholics and Muslims Arabs having faced Turkish ill-treatment together – 
affinity that had to be highlighted to foster new Lebanonist or loose Arab 
political communities after WW1. During his trials of will with Jamāl, al-
	uwayyik had tried to present himself as in some ways an intercessor-
representative for Druze/Muslim Lebanese individuals as well as for the 
Maronite sect: the clerical archivist Fr. Ibrāhīm 	arfūsh retransmitted it in 
1934, in a period in which Greater Lebanon’s Christians and Muslims had to 
be led to unifying images of their common past if the Lebanese state was to be 
viable in its coming independence. 
But Jamāl and his sometimes post-Muslim new Turkish elite had concerns 
apart from religions and sects. Pro-France sympathies among a purposeful, 
compact population such as the Maronites during a World War could provide a 
bridgehead: his duty to defend the Ottoman state’s territorial integrity bound 
him to clamp control down on the Maronite high clergy. No doubt, as a 
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schizoid sadist, Jamāl relished his power to exile the Patriarch from Lebanon at 
any time and harm humans who were Christian Lebanese. On another plane, as 
an acculturated Muslim or post-Muslim, Jamāl may have felt all he and his 
category of Turks had in common with Francophone elite Lebanese as against 
traditional Muslims. After the suffering he had ran ordinary Lebanese through 
by manipulating the flow of food, a crestfallen Jamāl – so Fr. Harfūsh’s 1934 
memorization ran – in a December 1917 meeting with al-	uwayyik confided 
his tensions with the German military, and seemed understanding of the 
Maronites’ preference for the French as mentors. In this swing, Jamāl was 
treating al-	uwayyik as a peer in a common Francophone culture that would 
promote modernity, and such a respect or admiration towards the Maronites 
may have always been latent in his pressurizing of their leader.30  
When facing Jamāl Pasha, in his untiring post-WW1 drive for a Greater 
Lebanon under French direction against resistance from some secularist 
Maronites as well as Muslims, and in the analytical sweep of his Arabic 
theological, social and political writings and addresses, Patriarch al-	uwayyik 
today bulks large in any memory of Lebanon’s history. The liberal Lebanese 
nationalist Dr. ɜIsām Khalīfah, a Maronite, in 1997 historiography he also 
tailored to help bring all Lebanese back together after their 1975-1990 War so 
that they could take back sovereignty, focused on al-	uwayyik’s “resistance” 
to the war-time famine – but also that the Patriarch tried to intercede for and 
get relief to local Druze/Muslims as well as Maronites during the famine; that 
he associated non-Catholic sects with his lobbying for an expanded Lebanon, 
separation from Syria and the French mandate after the War; and that he 
wanted to minimize France’s new control.31 Gouraud’s 1920 proclamation of 
that state was the first of two crucial turning-points for the construction of 
Lebanese sovereign nationhood, yet current inclusive Lebanonist intellectuals 
and academics do not then proceed to celebrate al-	uwayyik as an icon-
founder of Lebanon: his clerical function, and his long relation with the 
French, rule out acceptance by descendants of the Muslim populations that 
were incorporated by his efforts abroad more than by choice from them. 
The sufferings of Mount Lebanon’s Christians during World War I in the 
aftermath fuelled support among Catholics for a mandate by France. In the first 
item of the first issue in which al-Mashriq resumed publication in January 
1920, Shaykhū argued for France as the coming mandatory with reference to 
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the war-time sufferings of the Christians of Mount Lebanon. The break of five 
years that “the calamities” (= war-time conditions) imposed upon al-Mashriq 
had been borne by its editors with [religion-inspired] abr 
(patience/resignation/endura-nce/steadfastness). Although a Christianity-
inspired ethos, Shaykhū’s language here was certainly, as ever, tinted by Islam 
and its classical Arabs at every turn (“al-sabru l-jamīl li-ɜilmi-him ann Allāh 
maɜal-abirin” – a straight collage by Shaykhū of the language of Q 2:249, 
8:46, 8:66, 12:18, 12:83!). Now, though, the aesthetic links to Arab Muslims 
were outweighed by the recent sufferings and the Francophone links as 
Shaykhū and his readers entered the new era of “hopes” that was transforming 
the world. Shaykhū hailed the Allies for having “entered the havoc of the war 
to defend civilization and the rights of the weak peoples and to break the yokes 
holding down those that had been enslaved”. France “in the time of its war did 
not lose sight of our ordeals” and had spirited through “vast sums that saved 
from death thousands of people who were tottering with hunger”. 
Shaykhū’s editorial viewed Turkish repression and ill-treatment of his 
group during the war as a heightening of a long-standing struggle in which 
France had for centuries been the “refuge” of the Empire’s suffering 
[Christians]. France’s protection had won for “the remnants of Christianity in 
the [Ottoman] East” capitulatory privileges that reduced their sufferings but 
made the Turks envious. Shaykhū here had half-insight that the relationship 
with imperial France itself sparked some repression from the Turks who 
wanted to maintain their state or empire, but he could not grasp the 
manipulative economic motives of France’s expansion when he depicted her as 
always shedding her blood “for every noble principle” in the “purity of her 
intentions”.  
This editorial said that France offered relief from early after the Turkish 
collapse to “those in need from every sectarian group”. But its overall 
presentation of France as acting in West Asia to promote as well as protect the 
Catholics there could alienate Muslim Arabs incorporated into the expanded 
homeland-unit from not just France but those Catholics who allied to her.32  
 Shaykhū’s harsh binary oppositions here of (a) local Christians and a 
France that alone can modernize them against (b) Muslim Turks are intelligible 
in terms of the contraction of the Lebanese population during World War I, 
and the destroyed economy that that disintegration had bequeathed.  
In one fleeting item, Shaykhū did connect “the famine [caused by] the 
Turks” and post-War clashes between some Shiite Arabs and some Maronite 
and other Christians in southern Lebanon. The wartime “famine has turned 
into the war of the sharp swords” of those shedding torrents of “the blood of 
our murdered Christian brothers” in Marjaɜyun, Akkar, Tyre [all incorporated 
into Grand Liban] and the areas of MarɈash [Southern Turkey: massacres of 
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Armenians 1890, 1917] and Cicilia. This pan-Christian twinge at least of 
Shaykhū could conflate the Turks who systematically harmed his people and 
other non-Arabic Christians during World War I into various sets of local 
[Arab Muslims] who were more small-scale in the harm they did. Shaykhū was 
disturbed, though, that the French “second mother” was taking a long time to 
crush these [Arab Muslim] enemies as a deterrent example.33 This item fused 
France with Lebanon’s Catholics, and indeed a range of Christian populations 
scattered over the Middle East, but failed to name the enemies it lumped 
together as all “the Muslims”. 
The context of items after 1920 about Turkish or Muslim hostility or 
atrocities in WW1, and France as a consequent protector was the growing 
reaction against France and in favour of community with Muslim Arabs among 
educated Maronites. Interpretations of WW1 were mustered in these disputes.  
 
3. The Effects of World War 1 for Zionism and the Jews 
 
For Shaykhū, WW1, and specifically the overthrow of the Ottoman Empire 
he did not love, represented a turning-point towards the restoration of political 
power to Jews.  
In a 1920 overall study “Zionism, its Past, Present and Future”, Shaykhū 
with classical French-like perspective and clarity surveyed the various groups, 
such as the lovers of Zion, Theodor Herzel and his de-Judaized European 
Zionists, and the various populations of Jews, Ashkenazi and Sephardic, that 
got drawn to migrate to Palestine.  
Like many Arab-cultured clerics in Lebanon, Shaykhū could be oddly 
theosophist-like while a denouncer of freemasons: he defined the revival of 
Jewish strength as at the expense of Christians and Muslims together [in 
Palestine? the Arabic-speaking countries? the world?], although the armed 
Western Christian tradition that also fuelled his anger had formed in violent 
polarization against Islam during the Crusades. The entrance of the allies into 
Jerusalem in 1917 reminded the Christians of its conquest in 1099 by the 
Crusaders under Godfrey of Bouillon [Germanic but who mainly used French]. 
They did not foresee that their control over Jerusalem would now be contested 
by the Zionist group through the secret agreements that had been concluded 
between the great financiers among the Jews and the English State. Shaykhū 
interpreted this as having been revealed by the Balfour declaration of 2 
November 1917 that the British government might well foster in the coming 
peace a national home for the Jewish people in Palestine. The al-Mashriq 
article referred to, and Shaykhū clearly shared, the emotions of the Muslims as 
well as Christians in Palestine who raised their voices in protest and presented 
petitions to the League of Nations and to the allied states and to the Pope, 
leading English local personnel to offer reassurances – that there would never 
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be any Jewish government in Palestine – in which Shaykhū intimated he 
lacked any confidence. 
World War I had placed at stake Maronite communities and crucial 
Catholic religious shrines in Palestine. How anti-Semitic was Shaykhū’s 
essay? At one place, he recognized that many Jews themselves and especially 
the Sephardim opposed the idea of Zionism because it threatened to harm them 
in various ways. Overall, though, the almost pan-Islam-like logic of Shaykhū’s 
usual attraction to wide religion-defined groups or blocs – macro-histories – 
here again made him accept that the modern Zionists did represent the past of 
the Jews and a globe-scattered community of diaspora Jews who responded 
enthusiastically to the Zionist entry of Palestine.34 Shaykhū endorsed the 1920 
argument of Hayfa Maronite priest Būlus ɜAbbud that if Britain established a 
state for the Jews in Palestine that would “exile or enslave all other groups”. 
The ancient Israelite people in the age of its power had committed evil deeds 
that the prophets and Jesus excoriated: they now might again against the other 
races.35  
Lebanon’s Catholics, then, were quickly made aware that one of the most 
important long-term consequences of the Allied Powers’ defeat and partition 
of the Ottoman Empire would be a serious Jewish settlement in Palestine with 
a drive for political statehood. Thus the Zionist settlement one day might link 
the Maronites out to Arab nationalists in the region (– or provide an alternative 
centre of power to checkmate them?) 
 
2. The Representation of Armenians  
 
Mountain Lebanon’s Catholics had not interacted with Armenians just out 
there in the wider Ottoman Empire. In the early 19th century, Armenians in 
Aleppo established pious endowments (waqfs) to support charitable relief by 
monasteries in the Jabal’s Kisrawan area of the Armenian but perhaps also 
Maronite poor.36 In Shaykhū’s period, Armenians also had studied for medical 
degrees in St Joseph’s College in Beirut, and then, as doctors, treated 
Maronites: socialization that predisposed Lebanon’s clerical and specialized 
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Catholic elites to feel for suffering Armenians during World War I. 
Shaykhū’s learned journal al-Mashriq, in the wake of World War I, 
published two eye-witness articles recording massive deaths of Armenians 
under Turkish control during that conflict. The first, by the Maronite writer 
Yūzif Tawtal, described the arrival and fate of 300,000-400,000 Armenians 
driven from Anatolia to Dayr al-Zūr in an outlying province around Syria’s 
Euphrates river. From an old Maronite family of Aleppo, Tawtal at the time of 
Turkey’s 1916 violence against the Armenians had moved to the desert town 
to work as a Turkish-German translator. The other contribution, by the 
Armenian youth Badrus Arakiliyān who was only a teenager during the war, 
was written in French since he was educated by Jesuits in Anatolia, and then 
translated into Arabic by someone associated with al-Mashriq, or by Tawtal 
who had sheltered him as an escapee in his Dayr al-Zūr household.37 The tone 
of both testimonies was flat and sober. For instance, Tawtal gave credit to 
Dayr al-Zūr’s previous benign Turkish mutaarrifs Amad Rashīd, and the 
wartime Jalāl Bey who did his best to house the expelled Armenians arriving 
from Turkey until the Committee of Union and Progress regime in 
Constantinople replaced him with “a savage beast reincarnated in a human 
body”38. This article did not depict all Turks as evil. 
Although the two items must rate as primary testimonies, the al-Mashriq 
editors had not sketched in the preceding political and ideological context. 
Prior to World War I, Armenians had not been just passive recipients of 
communal violence from various Muslim Ottoman groups in the districts of 
Asia minor in which they were most numerous. Not just political activism but 
urban “terrorism” had been coming from amongst the Ottoman Armenian 
populations that the Turks now in 1916 moved to break in a final way. 
There were about 1,500,000 Armenians in the Ottoman Empire around the 
end of the nineteenth century, and 1,000,000 under Russian rule.39 Both 
Muslim and Christian Arabic-speakers had in the leadup to WW1 been 
viewing with keen interest the rapid organization of Armenian nationalism. In 
an 1895 letter from Paris, the Egyptian nationalist Mustafā Kāmil had urged 
his much less developed independence movement to seek organizational 
patterns from the “Eastern” (sic) Armenians’ activism.40  
Animus against Christian tenets or no, certain demographic realities had 
had to force any conceivable Ottoman government to crush Armenian 
demands for independence if its support from Muslims and thus the State itself 
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were to survive. H.G. Hogarth pointed out that there was no “geographical unit 
of the Ottoman [Empire] in which Armenians are the majority. If they cluster 
more thickly in the vilayets of easternmost Asia Minor than elsewhere, ... they 
are consistently a minority in any large administrative district”. Where, then, 
was it possible to constitute an autonomous Armenia?41 Establishing an 
Armenian state out of the Ottoman Empire thus had to muster the Powers’ aid 
for some sort of transfer of Turkish- and Kurdish-speaking Muslims out of the 
areas to form the new state. That threat helped spark rising violence against 
Armenian populations by Muslims, which some Armenian militants had 
courted with their own “terror” to draw in the Powers for a partition.42  
When in March 1915 Russian forces advanced on Van, some Armenians 
there revolted. The new Armenian uprisings inside Eastern Anatolia when 
combined with Entente thrusts from without threatened the heartland of the 
Turks and their ability to maintain any kind of state. March 1915 was the 
month in which Ottoman officials and police suddenly deported Arakiliyān 
and his sister and all other Armenians from the sylvan little town of Naw 
Shahr, most of whose residents were Turks and Greeks. Many males over 15 
were taken away and the women, teenagers and children escorted off in 
columns by foot to Syria: most died on the way from denial of adequate food 
and exposure in circuitous marches that read to have been designed by the 
Ottoman officials and police involved to wear them down. 
Arab observers at the time, and post-1970 Turkish and Armenian 
spokespersons and West-resident academics sympathetic to one or other of the 
two sides, concurred that by WW1 the Ottoman Armenians had been 
mobilized by nationalist political parties as no other populations before in the 
Ottoman lands and those in which Arabic is spoken. Yet the two testimonies 
al-Mashriq carried so soon after the quasi-genocide test how nationalist, and 
how politicized, the masses of these Armenians of Asia Minor had become by 
their final tragedy.  
 
2.1. Religion Sustains 
 
Overall, the two witnesses recorded little or nothing about any national or 
political identification that might have sustained Armenians through such 
extreme experiences. But there are references to a Christian God. At one point 
in the forced march it looked likely that Arakiliyan and his sister and her baby 
would drop behind the column and be left alone at the mercy of brigands: he 
told her “let us move forward relying on God and if our strength fails us die on 
the road”. Arakiliyan recalled that while waiting frozen and starving at Killis 
surviving on small amounts of coins the government handed out, the expelled 
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Armenians observed Easter, “but our wretched condition did not allow us to at 
all taste the celebrations of the Christian world” [= affect to Catholic Europe]. 
Arakiliyan repeatedly voiced gratitude to the Catholic European missionaries 
in Asia Minor who had educated him and in the process converted him from 
Gregorian orthodoxy. After their arrival in Dayr al-Zūr in June 1916, 
Arakiliyan, close to death imprisoned in an inn with other starved juvenile 
deportees, promises God that he will consecrate his life to the priesthood if he 
can slip out among the townsfolk. He did duly make himself a Catholic priest 
after the War.43  
 
2.2. The Christian West 
 
The remnants of Armenian populations that reached Syria faced ruin and 
possible extinction: but now they received some relief funds from the West. 
The divide between Protestant and non-Protestant churches ran deep in the 
internal societies of West Europe and the Americas, but even many Protestant 
Anglo-Saxons would identify with Orthodox Armenians when in polarization 
against Muslim Turks. Tawtal was given employment by the German Mission 
at Dayr al-Zūr to procure necessities and as a translator for their interactions 
with Turks. He thus could view the slaughter that the new mutaarrif Zakī Bey 
conducted against the deported Armenians from June 1916.44 During the 
events, financial aid was coming from European and American charitable 
societies via the American consulate in Aleppo, which Tawtal would convey to 
the refugees45, until the feral Zakī ended such transfers. 
Thus, these two items about the Armenians that al-Mashriq carried 
somewhat bore out for Maronites early in French mandatory rule that Christian 
populations in the Middle East could count on substantial aid from Westerners 
in disregard of their Catholic, Protestant and Orthodox divides, if they came 
into conflict with more numerous Muslims in the region. 
As well as hating neighborhood Turks, the Maronite Tawtal very much 
believed in the ideology of World War, of two camps of nations fighting it out 
around the globe and of his duty to stand with the camp that pivoted around 
France. When, because he was among the few who spoke fluent German, he 
was offered the dragoman post with the German mission, he had to accept 
“despite my intense partiality [as a mission-educated Catholic] for France” in 
the Middle East and in macro-history.46 After he was inducted into the 
Ottoman army, he was as overjoyed that the final British offensive from Sinai 
smashed the military reputation of Erich von Falkenhayn as that it drove the 
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Turks from Palestine and Syria.47  
After WW1, the Catholic priest Butrus Ghālib in his defence of an old 
alliance with France in the face of local reaction against her, wrote of 
Christians of the East without regard to their sects in the face of Muslim 
power: they all needed their Protector. Such pan-Christianism was not 
nourished by the divisive pride Arakiliyan and Tawtal voiced that they were 
Catholics of a West-patterned type. The Maronite Tawtal articulated pan-
Catholicism rather than pan-Christianism towards the victimized Armenians he 
witnessed. He structured his data on the martyrdom of the Catholic Armenian 
priest Petros Aghājāniān so as to depict the Gregorian clergy as intent to harm 
their Catholic clerical peers, and as traffickers of deported Armenian women. 
Aghajanian’s relief and preaching work among all sects of the displaced 
Armenians quickly won the confidence of “in particular the non-Catholic 
Armenians who were not accustomed to encounter in their own clerics such 
zeal for their salvation”. Aghajanian’s expounding of the sufferings of Jesus to 
the victims in order to foster religious steadfastness would have looked to his 
Gregorian peers like poaching – a preliminary to conversion that had in it 
considerable abuse of some highly traumatized and dependent non-Catholics.48 
The indigenous converted or born Catholics often shared the assumption of the 
West’s churches of some right or mission from God to erase the beliefs of all 
other confessions that claimed to be Christian, not to speak of Muslims, in the 
Third World. This sectarianism ran against thinking in terms of integrating a 
language-determined political nation for all Armenians (or one to link even 
just all Christians among the Lebanese). 
 
2.3. Images of Muslim Arabs 
 
What attitudes towards Muslim Arabs would this category of articles by or 
about (Catholic) Armenian survivors have promoted among Catholic 
Lebanese? Distinction has to be drawn between (a) images of Arab nomads 
and (b) those of sedentary or urban Arabs. al-Mashriq’s two articles imaged 
that during the marches the nomad category extorted the refugees’ dwindling 
monies and belongings and abducted some of the surviving females.49 They 
still lacked the attributed drive of the Turks to kill them all off. However, the 
item does indicate that some Arabic-speaking nomads had a kinder attitude. 
When the Turks heaped up the malnourished Armenian minors on carts to be 
taken for final drowning in the Euphrates, some who swam away found 
sanctuary in some camps of the Arabic-speaking nomads (al-ɜurbān): the 
Maronite Yūsuf Sukkar recovered some such minors and looked after them for 
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the duration of the War.50 Muslim men in Dayr al-Zūr, Tawtal imaged, took 
Armenian women into their house but for self-gratification; when they tired of 
them they drove them out.51 
These two items from the still-recent destruction of the Armenians were 
anti-Turkish, but also could have resonated to Lebanese Christian folk-
memories of the 1860 Druze-Maronite-Muslim mayhem in Lebanon and 
Damascus. The characterization of Syria’s [Muslim] “Arabs” (= nomads? 
urban?) showed some as uncompassionate to at least Armenian Christians – 
could the Maronites build a pan-Syrian state with them? – but terminologies 
like “al-ɜArab” may be antique and not belong to ethnicist, national or Islam-
targeting modes of thought at all. 
Few al-Mashriq items much identified a language-defined Armenian group 
or political nation whose core would be the majority that remained still mainly 
Orthodox-Gregorian. The main positive community in the two items by 
Arakiliyan and Tawtal was that between Catholics from different areas, 
languages and continents – a crude pan-Catholicism more than any national 
community of all who spoke Armenian or any incorporative pan-Christianism. 
The two writers offer little about sects-integrating language nationhood as a 
source of resistance from the Armenians being deported. On balance, these 
materials suggest that rural Armenians had been less incorporated into the pre-
1918 Armenian secessionist parties than (a) early Arabo-Muslim nationalists 
and (b) post-WW2 Armenian and Turkish ideologues and historiography have 
all imaged. 
Why did Shaykhū choose to publish the two items as editor of al-Mashriq? 
There were old Armenian monastries in Mount Lebanon and Lebanon-Syria’s 
Catholic professionals studied with Catholic Armenians at St Joseph’s College 
in Beirut – community. Maybe he reflected that Armenian refugees now 
settling in Lebanon would boost the Christian component of the tensely-
balanced new multi-sectarian state of Greater Lebanon. Armenians for 
Lebanon’s clericist Catholic intellectuals were – at least the Catholics among 
them – fellow-Christian co-victims of Muslim Turks. al-Mashriq in the wake 
of WW1 seldom voiced awareness of Armenian-speakers in general as a 
political nation, although one brief item by Shaykhū did endorse post-War 
lobbying by Armenian nationalist lobbyists in Europe for statehood under 
tutelage.52 
Al-Mashriq conveyed images of Westerners educating, treating and coming 
to the aid of Armenian Christians. Some might make that endorse the option of 
a French mandate for Lebanon. But could Christian minorities’ connections 
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with Western powers bent on partitioning out the Ottoman Empire have helped 
detonate violence and ill-treatment from Turks? And clericist intellectual 
milieus may not have been able to get their sympathetic memorization of the 
Armenians across to some ordinary Maronites, who left only precarious, 
marginal lives to Armenian refugees who subsisted on, hopelessly shattered, 
for decades.53  
 
3. The Famine under Turkish Occupation: The Process of Memo-rization 
 
Al-Mashriq had authority as the apex of Lebanon’s high Catholic 
intellectualism, but Shaykhū publicized the much wider net of authors 
attempting accounts and overview-syntheses of WW1 and its Lebanon-Syria 
theatre in 1919-1925. The range of Christian writers in Lebanon who were 
attempting to produce constructions of WW1 reinforced each others’ impact 
on the secondary elite of journalists and politicians who diffused the new 
world view out to wide classes of Lebanese.54  
Some discordant works had to be kept out of the register of this new 
Lebanonist discourse. Some were by local Christians. The Maronite cleric 
Marun Ghusn during the War published verses in praise of the Ottoman Sultan 
Muhammad Rashad and the CUP’s Enver and Jamāl. Shaykhū equally rapped 
the ecumenical-theosophist freemason Felix Fāris for publishing in 1916 from 
Aleppo an Arabic translation of a German nationalist book on Germany’s 
progress in 25 years – he was only currying the favor of the Power that had 
become the ally of the ruling CUP, the Jesuit charged.55 The surpassing 
Maronite poet Shiblī Mallā, too, had paid compliments to the Turkish leaders 
during WW1, and later excused his words as to escape exile or dispossession, 
and to use the links to aid the poor and the clerics.56 Yet given Mallat’s 
subsequent openness under the French to Arab Muslim leaders in the wide 
Middle East, his keeping up of contacts could have sprung from some drive for 
wide secular community, in which the post-traditional CUP sometimes 
prefigured later Muslim pan-Arabs. Such voices from Maronites and other 
Catholics could keep the Ottoman Empire still somewhat problematical for the 
incipient memorization of World War I as the closure of any community with 
Turks. Shaykhū was not happy that some local Muslim Arab writers, including 
some who were his friends, had published in solidarity with the Turks and their 
Caliphate during WW1, but that was a different type of problem for this new 
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Lebanonist national memory.  
The memorization of the direct Turkish occupation of the Mountain during 
WW1 and of the famine that occurred lacked much central direction from the 
weak Lebanese particularist government that France set up in 1920. 
Ambiguous, disturbing, unusable features in the cacophony of memories that 
various Catholic Lebanese voiced from the 1920s hampered the Famine from 
being commemorated by Lebanese state nationalism in the way that famines at 
the hands of a vivid enemy have been made central in the discourses of Irish 
and Ukrainian nationalisms.  
In the early 21st century, the Westernist Maronite historian Yūsuf 
Muɜawwad was to question reticence about the famine in much official 
discourse and ritual life of the Lebanese state from 1920, and the failure of 
several generations of Lebanese authors to produce a single good perspective 
history of the WW1 period in the Jabal. Some writers asserted that the Turks 
deliberately starved the Christian Lebanese in retaliation for their loyalty to 
France. Yet some Christian families had made fortunes as middlemen, traders 
and brutal stockpilers of food out of the suffering and deaths of their ordinary 
correligionists, and duly were powerful in the system of the new Lebanon 
statelet throughout the 1920s and after, as some speeches of Patriarch al-
	uwayyik, an architect of Greater Lebanon and the mandate, hinted.57 Jamāl’s 
manipulation of the flow of foodstuffs in order to bring the Maronite high 
clerics to heel thus connected into the further development of the old feudal 
families and the ongoing class-formation of rising, newer bourgeois elements 
among the Maronites that were jostling for position against the sect’s high 
clerics during WW1. The post-1920 Maronite political elite was not eager to 
set up any recurring rituals or discourse that – as well as the Islamo-Turkish 
enemy – would spotlight to ordinary Maronites and Christians aspects of 
evolving indigenous social structure it was in some ascendant families’ interest 
to obscure. The events of the Famine had in them social disintegration, clan-
selfishness and some profiteering atomism by fellow-Catholics that could call 
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into question whether discourse-images of either a humane Lebanese nation-
community or the Christian community sustained by a gentle God taught from 
churches had always had truth on the ground. The Famine could be the end of 
the ideologies if some parts were not tightly managed or whited out. 
Rudiments for the neo-pagan particularist nationalism that was built up 
after the 1920 proclamation of Greater Lebanon were projected by Salmā 
āɛigh (1889-1953), who published in mostly feminist Arabic journals and 
journeyed to Brazil. Her articles were republished at the end of the 1930s in 
the hard-cover collection Nasamāt. Yet a problem for the construction of a 
new triumphalist Lebanonist national ideology was caught in her apprehension 
that the great famine inflicted a sort of end of meaning and ideology on the 
Christian inhabitants of Mountain Lebanon who passed through it during 
WW1. The crisis in the Mountain under Jamāl Pasha had left little heart in 
many for post-war construction and modernization. In “Church Bells of the 
Season” (nawāqīs al-ɜīd), Salmā āɛigh lamented the privations of the years of 
the war: 
 
“Remind us, bells, of those black days (...) cold as death when the death-rattle 
of the dying and the curses of the crucified cut into your moaning, making us 
hear the lamentation of Lebanon, walking behind the great funeral procession! 
(...) The people entering the churches with heads bowed, coming out with 
hearts and souls broken and unbelieving, for hunger knows no faith! Remind 
us of them all, the exiled and the crucified, the starving and the persecuted”. 
 
In “Yā bilādī” Salmā āɛigh hymned her “homeland, the Mountain of the 
cedar, an objective unattainable to the most ambitious of conquerors over the 
ages. Their invading hosts faded away one after the other but Lebanon 
remained until now in glorious life above its decaying monuments”. She 
wanted the dead civilizations the monuments such as those at Baɜlabakk 
represented to be systematically maintained in new museums to foster the new 
community consciousnesses getting differentiated in Lebanon-Syria. “O sons 
of my land who are near and far: give me a homeland or I shall die”58.  
Thus, the famine in Mount Lebanon during WW1 could offer Salmā 
Sāyigh an activist or motivating message as building a Lebanese state got 
under way. As frequently, though, as her anger against a Turkish enemy, the 
social disintegration left her and ordinary Lebanese with a deadening sense of 
the meaningless loss of the victims, and the fragility of all ideologies. Her 
contribution to memory of that sector of World War 1 retained a communal 
Catholic identity to the extent that church bells remained the emblem over the 
group, but she had a humanist sense that beliefs could hold frail humans 
together only so long as the sufferings did not become too great. Her mild 
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feminism and injection of images from pagan pasts into her rough nationalism 
were at odds with the clericist Catholic ideology of the 1920s at least. 
Gratitude to the French in the light of the past national suffering was 
implanted among educated Lebanese by use of art and new communications 
media. The two litterateurs Jean al-Dibs and [the freemasonic, sometimes pan-
Syrian] Felix Fāris invited Beirut’s journalists and writers to an exhibition. It 
was of statues that Jean al-Dibs had sculpted and photographs Fāris had 
collected to represent “the sufferings, oppression and hunger inflicted [by the 
CUP regime] upon our land during the Great War and then of France’s 
achievements following the war– that miracle of love and magnanimity by 
which she lifted us up from our collapse, bandaged our wounds and revived 
our economic and national life”. 
Al-Bashīr assessed that the audience responded to “the orator” Felix Fāris’ 
accompanying verbal commentary: the two intended to take the exhibition on a 
tour – with use of moving film – of the Americas “so that the sons of the 
homeland in the diaspora can witness the horrors of the war and scenes of the 
homeland and its population”59.  
In this particular stance by Fāris and al-Dibs, depiction of the horrors the 
Lebanese population passed through under the CUP during World War I gave 
France credibility as the mandatory power with the skills as well as the 
affection to set the economic havoc right. Past national struggle and suffering 
were being implanted in the Lebanese elite and potentially wider audiences 
using a combination of media new in the Middle East. 
The clericists and the French in unison cited the motif of past relief by 
France to justify the new Mandate. In 1921, a superior abbot of the Maronite 
Order Fr. Ighnatiyus al-Tannūrī at the Order’s seminary, along with the other 
monks, elaborately welcomed the Governor of Lebanon [Commander Albert] 
Trabaud [– whose appointment had not been welcomed by young Maronite 
radicals who wanted a native governor and especially not a Frenchman of 
peremptory military background]. One of the brothers delivered an “elegant” 
French speech in which he praised the governor for his “painstaking labors… 
today to lift the Lebanese population up into the realm of development and 
prosperity” [= economic and financial infrastructure, entrepreneurial private 
enterprise and transcontinental capitalism]. “The Governor, in thanking the 
superior abbot [al-Tannūrī], praised his colleagues, the clergy who are 
advocates for religious values” replied: 
 
“I can never forget that bill you sent to me [during World War 1] to ask for a 
loan of one million franks you could use for the relief of your homeland’s 
destitute. The French Government donated the full amount”. 
 
Then Governor Trabaud said that since the Lebanese were the friends of 
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France and the Orient’s Frenchmen, he would “spare no effort to lift the 
population of the Jabal up from their fallen state, to the very summits of 
glory”60.  
This particular reconstruction of the living history of ill-treatment and 
famine that the Jabal’s Christians suffered in WW1 was, then, being injected 
by the French and a category of particularists into a forming collective identity 
that would simultaneously (a) differentiate Maronites/Catholics from wider 
Muslim speakers of Arabic, and (b) argue their almost inherent linkages to a 
Western power. Such post-1918 structuring of the memorization of a past of 
war-time suffering would made more acceptable the tutelage that was indeed 
to offer more modernization and prosperity to some categories of Maronites, 
although still leaving most rural Maronites poor when the mandate finished in 
the mid-1940s.  
Communications from French officials under the mandate are often notable 
for how little community they affirmed with the Maronites and Melkites. al-
Bashīr’s extracts from the speech of Governor Trabaud nowhere indicated that 
he termed either himself or the state or the people he represented as 
“Christian”, or that any feelings from a shared Christianity had motivated him 
or other Frenchmen to come to the relief of the Maronites during the 
starvation. It was the Maronite order his compliments said had the religious 
values.  
 
4. Some Openness to Turks Continues 
 
A certain inconclusiveness about how many Turks set out to harm Arabic-
speaking Christians, and how far, marked some early Maronite recording of 
memory of the World War 1 period in the Jabal (Mountain Lebanon). While 
the symbols and rituals of Christianity gave many Maronites the resolve to 
survive the years of the war, they were not always at once totalistically 
dichotomized against the Muslim Turks in the post-war Catholic narrative that 
was forming. Some capacity for openness continued in the psyche of 
individuals in each group, despite the extreme distrust that many Turks had 
vented as their empire disintegrated and died. 
A mixed item of this kind was Yūsuf Burus Saɜd’s late 1922 piece “The 
Star of the Wise Men from the East”. The setting was Christmas Day 1916 and 
the threat of family disintegration caused by the famine as it forced the 
Lebanese to sell their homes, stock and lands for a little food – a perspective 
not far from Salmā Sāɜigh’s. The impressment of doctors into the Turkish 
armed forces had not left many around to treat the victims of the local 
epidemics. Saɜd’s very literary item voiced rage that the oppressors stripped 
from Lebanon’s slopes [for the Empire’s military Railway] “the trees that the 
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ancients had planted with such effort (...) so that they might take from Lebanon 
even the beautiful climate that God had given it after they sentenced its people 
to starvation”. A father was brought before a martial law court after light in the 
shape of a star was seen rising from the cave in which his ill-nourished family 
was sheltering on Christmas Eve. Given all the Allied warships at anchor 
outside Beirut and Junieh, the Turks understandably thought the Maronite rite 
a signal to them. After the father is taken away, a red government cow wanders 
to the wife and children, who then takes it to the court that is trying her 
provider. Touched by the family’s honesty, the court frees the husband, and 
grants a reward of wheat to them. The local Turkish governor, ɜAlī Ziyā Pāshā, 
the owner of the cow, gifts it to the family out of pity at their poverty: the cow 
and the wheat see the family through the months of scarcities of foodstuffs that 
follow. 
In this narrative, the incarnate Christ-god is the emblem defining Lebanon 
to itself and to others, and Turks as a collectivity are hated for their wartime 
actions. Yet a complete dichotomization against Christianity is missed: some 
Turks are seen as non-vicious or good. Also, the narrator states that he learnt 
of the arrest from overhearing a few Turkish soldiers, which could indicate that 
understanding of Turkish had spread more in the Jabal.61  
Al-Mashriq’s accounts of WWI massacres against Armenians could deepen 
fear against at least the Turkish category of Muslims amongst Lebanese 
Christians. Yet Fr. Luis Shaykhū did in 1920 present his “salutations to some 
noble individuals of the defunct regime who – even if their number did not 
pass beyond the fingers of the hand – refused to get involved in the savagery of 
their fellow-Turks and indeed tried to resist their injustices… by treating the 
suffering people with kindness and by defending those who were being 
persecuted: may God reward them!”62 The publication of bilingual Arabic-
Turkish volumes on Beirut and Mountain Lebanon was an ongoing outcome of 
the intellectual collaboration that the Lebanese had conducted with some 
Muslim Turks to 1919.63 
Despite all they had suffered at the hands of the Ottomans during World 
War 1, the things that Lebanese Catholics had built up with Turks during that 
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Empire’s five centuries, especially the moralistic stances and pretences that 
always went with membership for all Ottoman groups, continued into the 
1920s. 
In sexual morality and their structuring of relations between the sexes, 
Catholicist-particularist organs and spokesmen in Lebanon voiced more 
sympathy for the oriental puritanism of their Muslim neighbors than for the 
more open permissive attitudes of a France whose Christian and modernist 
character they held up as some kind of model only in some contexts. In mid-
1922 al-Bashīr quoted the official Turkish newspaper Taqvim-i-Vaqaɛiɜ that 
some Muslim ladies in coming to roam here and there outside their houses 
were violating both [Islam’s] religious law (sharīɜah) and “national morals”. 
The Maronite ecclesiastics of that era were not far behind Islamic-minded 
Turks in regard to regulating women: if they wore revealing dresses to masses 
the priests had to deny them the Holy Sacraments.64  
The memories of Turkish cruelty or dereliction against the Lebanese and 
other Christians during World War 1 were not strong enough to snap the 
“Eastern” commonality many Catholic Lebanese felt they had with the Turks 
vis-à-vis Westerners – even Catholic ones. An article titled “The Beauty 
Competition in Rio de Janeiro”, and published in the al-Bashīr in 1931, 
mingled Catholicism’s sexual puritanism and an “Eastern” kinship with the 
Turks. The competitors at the international contest had been forced to wear 
only modest costumes due to the preceding campaigns by Brazil’s men of 
religion. “Eastern patriotism” had been shown by Brazil’s Christian Lebanese 
when they received the lonely Turkish entrant – Jewish, although they would 
have welcomed a Muslim Turkish woman – almost as warmly as Lebanon’s.65  
In the 1930s, Rafāɛīl Nakhlah and some of his Lebanese clerical colleagues 
monitored the functionality with which the Ataturkists widened mass 
education and popularized a coherent nationalist world view by a Latin-script 
reinvention of Turkish. Nakhlah accepted the – “materialist,” positivist-like – 
new Turkish ruling class’ purging of the pedantic superstructure of Arabic and 
Persian loan words to propagate a practicable print-medium much closer to 
popular speech. He wanted Lebanese educationalists to follow features of the 
new Turkish readers that quickly taught primary school pupils rapid reading.66 
 
5. Patterns of Long-term Significance 
 
World War 1 stands as a turning point in the development of Catholic 
Lebanese identity. Global warfare activated the full triple make-up (Arab-
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Western-Christian) of the multi-lingual clerics. Of all groups in the Arab 
World, the Catholicist-Lebanese elite had the strongest simultaneous sense of 
the two – Middle Eastern and European – theatres of warfare together. 
The war years ended forever the option of any membership by Maronites in 
any multi-lingual, multi-religious state or confederation headed by Turks. The 
strong narrative of the blood pouring out from a few individual Maronite 
martyrs – they functioned more than the wide famine – now ended any need to 
understand, let alone refute, the propositions advanced by an opposed faction 
of Catholics who had sought co-citizenship with Turks. The martyrs and the 
famine could henceforth foster interpretations of Catholic identity that tended 
to blend creed and homeland-polity. 
Yet the other Maronite grouping carried on. Amīn al-Rayhānī after 1918 
still lamented the refusal of many Catholics of the post-1908 Ottoman 
parliamentarism, and pan-Arab or pan-Syrian successor-ideas were developed. 
The classicist tastes of the clerics themselves towards literary Arabic as a 
language and culture fostered community with Muslim Arab neighbours. The 
Lebanese Maronite particularism that now was to be developed would have in 
it (a) a tendency that strove to build more constructive political relations with 
West Asia’s Muslim Arab populations, and (b) another that wanted sweeping 
separation and a protector West.  
The war in Europe and then the arrival of racist, incompatible French 
soldiers and officials put in flux how all categories of Lebanon’s Catholics 
came to view the French and Westerners after 1918. The issue of France’s 
survival and the Francophone link softened the hatred the ultra-clericists had 
voiced against the West’s secularism and positivism. Following the French 
jingos, Shaykhū tried to present the War as a triumph for France and even such 
Catholicism as it had, but al-Mashriq’s data left no doubt of the sweeping 
destruction in Europe out of which all its states and all their ideologies 
stumbled depleted and feeble. Throughout the Mandate, Maronite cleric-
politicians from the patriarchs down were discreetly aware that after WW1 the 
morale and purpose of their profiteering French patrons could cave at any 
moment – that France might leave them in the lurch.  
A parliamentarism that would last in Lebanon required that Maronites and 
Muslims and Druze feel that they had shared culture, ideas and fruitful 
common enterprises in the past. But some clericists read from WW1 patterns 
of a camp of pan-Catholic nations vis-à-vis a Muslim Middle East back into 
the crusades of the Middle Ages and from there into the new 20th century. 
This could place Arabic-speaking Christians and Muslim Arabs in two 
separate warring international camps. The clericists’ themes that the French 
mandatory was motivated to its maternalism towards Christians by a shared 
(attenuated) Christianity with crusader roots could make some Muslims 
reluctantly put into the new statelet more opposed to “the Maronites” as well 
as represser France. Conversely, the forming commemoration of shared 
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victimization by a common Turkish enemy during WW1 increased the chances 
for Christians and Muslim Arabs to construct community in at least the 
expanded Greater Lebanon state that General Gouraud set up in 1920. 
The War’s loss of life and its chaos would long make it hard for pro-
clerical Catholic writers to formulate any pan-Christian ideology really able to 
bracket Christianity, Eastern Christians, the West and modernity. The War 
placed in question if any ideology or alliance could any more motivate or be 
viable. 
